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BAR BRIEFS
Organized Bar Administration. One of, the newest fields of
professional service relates to the administration of organized
bar activities. The present opportunities for full-time employment are relatively few in number, -but the field is growing as
more bar associations find the resources with which to expand
their administrative personnel.
The full-time organized bar administrator, usually designated as executive or assistant secretary, supervises the routine
functions of his association, including the editing of an association periodical. He enjoys the stability of a fixed salary and
the pleasure of working exclusively with and among lawyers.
Many bar executives begin as part-time secretaries, building
their organizations to the point where they can support a fulltime administrative officer.
(Continued in next issue)
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Respt., vs. C. J. Myers, Deft. and
Applt.
That the transcript of the official stenographer's minutes of the evidence and proceedings at a trial is, when certified as correct by the trial
court, a part of the statement of the case and when filed with the clerk
of the district court becomes a part of the record on appeal.
That upon appeal, the statement of the case as certified by the trial
court imports absolute verity.
That where the statement of the case shows that a defendant in a
criminal case waived written instructions, the fact that such waiver is not
entered in the clerk's minutes of the trial is not prejudicial error.
That evidence is held sufficient to sustain a conviction of the defendant for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. R. G. McFarland, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J. Christianson, Ch. J.
dissenting.
In International Shoe Company, a corporation, Pltf. and Applt., vs.
First National Bank & Trust Company, et al., Respt. and Deft.
That where at a trial of action, depositions of witnesses are offered
in evidence, and it appears from such depositions that the witnesses are
not resident of the county in which the trial is being held, the fact of such
nonresidence as a foundation for the reception of the depositions in evidence need not be established by independent testimony.
That in an action by a corporation, the plaintiff need not prove the
corporate existence of the corporation upon the trial unless the answer is
verified and contains an allegation positive and not on information and belief, that the plaintiff is not a corporation.
(Section 10-1402 N. D. R. C.
1943).
That the admission of incompetent testimony in evidence at the trial
of an action is not prejudicial error where the facts which such evidence
tends to prove are otherwise conclusively established by competent evidence.
That in this State a partnership liability is joint and not joint and
several.
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That where for any cause the name of one or more partners has been
omitted in any action in which judgment has been entered against the defendants named in the summons, and such omission was not pleaded in
such action, the plaintiff, in case the judgment therein shall remain unsatisfied may recover of such partner separately upon proving his joint
liability. (Sub-section 4 of Section 32-30001 N. D. R. C. 1943).
That an action brought pursuant to the provisions of Sub-section 4 of
Section 32-3001 N. D. R. C. 1943 is one upon the prior judgment and such
judgment, if valid, is conclusive upon the question of partnership liability in such action.
That where two partners have been sued jointly upon a partnership
liability, and at the trial of the action the case has been erroneously dismissed as to one but prosecuted to judgment against the other, and upon
appeal a new trial has been ordered with respect to the defendant in whose
favor nonsuit was granted, such new trial is governed by the provisions
of Sub-section 4 of Section 32-3001 N. D. R. C. 1943.
That a trial court may require a general verdict with special findings.
That a party to an action is not prejudiced by the fact that there was
a variance between the form of verdict the jury were instructed would
be submitted to them and that which they received and returned into
court, where the variance was such that it would not tend to confuse or
mislead the jury and where it was within the power of the court to submit the form of verdict which the jury returned.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Hon. M. J. Englert,
Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the -Court by Burke, J..
In W. H. Stutsman, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Max Smith and John Klein,
Defts. and Applts.
That where certificates of tax sales issued to a county, erroneously
stated that the county was entitled to a deed one day short of the statutory
period but no steps were taken looking to the termination of the owner's
right of redemption until more than seven years after the maturity of the
certificates, no prejudice to the original owner resulted from the error and
he cannot rely upon it to defeat the county's title.
That the provisions of ch. 235, Sess. Laws N. D. 1939, relating to the
manner of terminating the right of redemption of the owner of property
sold to the county for delinquent taxes, applies to all tax deed proceedings initiated subsequent to its effective date and prior to the effective
date of ch. 286, Sess. Laws N. D. 1941.
That tax deeds issued in the name of the county auditor as grantor to
the county as grantee are void.
That where the statutory proceedings for terminating the owner's right
of redemption to land sold to the county on tax sale were followed, title
passed to the county in the absence of redemption although no valid tax
deed was issued.
That a void tax deed does not import verity of the proceedings leading up to its issuance.
That where in the course of tax deed proceedings a county auditor
issues and serves a notice of expiration of redemption, valid on its face,
wherein the amounts of subsequent taxes, penalty and interest lawfully
included, are stated separately as to each year and the notices are introduced, in evidence without challenge to the correctness of the amounts and
there is nothing in the record to indicate that they are not correct, the
amounts so stated will be presumed to be correct on a trial, de novo in
this court.
That the failure of the county auditor to include publication costs in
the notice of expiration of the period of redemption mailed to the land-
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owner under the provisions of ch. 235, Sess Laws N. D. 1939, while including such costs in the amount set forth in the published notice does not invalidate the proceedings where no attempt was made to redeem and no
prejudice is shown.
That in order to effect a redemption under the provisions of ch. 235,
Sess. Laws N. D. 1939, the redemptioner must pay subsequent taxes, penalty and interest upon certificates that have been issued to the county more
than three years prior to the issuince of the notice of expiration of the
period of redemption and such subsequent taxes should be included in
the notice.
That a former owner of real property to which the county has acquired
title by tax deed proceedings who seeks to redeem or repurchase under
the provisions of secs. 18 and 19, ch. 286, Sess. Laws N. D. 1941, must pay
all taxes lawfully assessed or taxed against the land with penalties and
interest where a less amount has not been fixed by the board of county
commissioners as a fair and just sales price and the cancellation of such
taxes or assessments pursuant to the provisions of ch. 235, Sess. Laws
N. D. 1939, does not relieve him from the duty to make such payment.
Appeal from the District Court of Morton County, Hon. H. L. Berry,
Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Morris.
In the State of North Dakota ex rel Nels G. Johnson, Attorney General, Petr., vs. Berta E. Baker, as State Auditor of the State of North Dakota, Respt.
That a legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional and in
case of doubt as to its constitutionality the doubt must be resolved in favor
of its validity.
That the constitutionality of a statute cannot be questioned by one
whose rights it does not affect and who has no legal interest in defeating it.
That the constitutionality of a statute will be considered only when
the question is properly before the court and necessary to a determination
of the cause.
That as a general rule a ministerial officer to whom no injury can result and to whom no violation of duty can be imputed by reason of the
performance of an act in compliance with the requirements of a statute,
may not question its constitutionality.
That pursuant to the constitution and the statutes of
the state of
North Dakota, when a state officer is in doubt as to the constitutionality
of a statute, under the terms of which he is called upon to perform a ministerial act, it is his duty t6 consult with and procure the opinion of the
attorney general with respect to the matter and be guided in his action by
that opinion until it is superseded by judicial decision. If he follows this
course he will be protected and absolved from liability under his oath and
on his official bond. If he does not request an opinion from the attorney
general, or, having done so disregards it, and refuses to perform as required by the statute, he cannot raise the question of its constitutionality
as a defense in a mandamus proceeding to compel performance.
Original application for a writ of mandamus. Writ granted.
Opinion of the Court by Nuessle, J., Morris and Burr, J. J. dissenting.

